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ABStRACt
In terms of their social composition, the crusades to Palestine and Syria were 
unlike any other military campaigns in the Middle Ages or the modern world. 
The liberation and defence of the Holy Land required primarily the participa-
tion of experienced, motivated and well-equipped members of the traditional 
Western military classes, and the core of each crusade expedition was made 
up of the retinues of kings, prelates and the higher aristocracy from the coun-
tries of Europe which produced the main responses to papal calls to crusade. 
However, the canonical definition of crusades as penitential pilgrimages meant 
that most expeditions during the first century of the movement included large 
numbers of non-combatant men, women and children, which caused significant 
problems with regard to discipline and logistics. This situation only changed in 
the later twelfth century with a shift to the use of naval transport rather than the 
traditional land routes.
keywords: Crusades, knights, military professionalism, civilians, non-comba-
tants.
RESuMEn
Respecto a su composición social, las cruzadas a Palestina y Siria fueron di-
ferentes a cualquier otra campaña militar medieval o moderna. La liberación 
y defensa de Tierra Santa requirió fundamentalmente de la participación de 
miembros experimentados, motivados y bien equipados pertenecientes a las 
clases militares tradicionales de Occidente. Del mismo modo, el núcleo de 
cada expedición cruzada se conformó a partir de los séquitos de los reyes, 
prelados y alta aristocracia de los países europeos en los que más respuestas 
se produjeron a las llamadas papales. Sin embargo, la definición canónica de 
las cruzadas como peregrinaciones penitenciales significaba que la mayoría 
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de las expediciones acaecidas en el primer siglo del movimiento incluyesen 
grandes cifras de individuos no combatientes, incluyendo mujeres y niños, los 
cuales generaron importantes problemas en lo tocante a la disciplina y la lo-
gística. Esta situación solo se vio modificada a finales del siglo XII, cuando se 
produjo un cambio en las rutas de transporte de las terrestres a las marítimas.
palabras clave: Cruzadas, caballeros, profesionalismo militar, civiles, no 
combatientes.
RESuM
Guerrers i civils a les croades: identitats militars i estatus en l’alli-
berament i defensa de terra Santa (1096-1204)
Respecte a la seva composició social, les croades a Palestina i Síria foren dife-
rents a qualsevol altre campanya militar medieval o moderna. L’alliberament i 
defensa de Terra Santa va requerir fonamentalment la participació de membres 
experimentats, motivats i ben equipats pertanyents a les classes militars tradi-
cionals d’Occident. De la mateixa manera, el nucli de cada expedició es va 
conformar a partir dels sèquits dels reis, prelats, i alta aristocràcia dels països 
europeus en els que més respostes es van produir a les crides papals. No obs-
tant això, la definició canònica de les croades com peregrinacions penitencials 
significava que la majoria de les expedicions esdevingudes en el primer segle 
del moviment incloguessin grans xifres d’individus no combatents, incloent do-
nes i nens, els quals van generar importants problemes respecte a la disciplina 
i logística. Aquesta situació es va veure modificada a finals del segle XII, quan 
es va produir un canvi de rutes de transport de  les terrestres a les marítimes.
paraules clau: Croades, cavallers, professionalisme militar, civils, no com-
batents.
http://http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/Millars.2017.43.4 - ISSN: 1132-9823 - vol. XLIII 2017/2 - pp. 97-127
99
1. introDuCtion: the genesis of CrusADing
1.1. pope urban II’s Appeal to knighthood
And so I Nivello, raised in a nobility of birth which produces in many 
people an ignobility of mind, for the redemption of my soul and in 
exchange for a great sum of money given me for this, renounce for 
ever in favour of St Peter the oppressive behaviour resulting from a 
certain bad custom, handed on to me not by ancient right but from the 
time of my father, a man of little weight who harassed the poor with 
this oppression. Thereafter I constantly maintained it in an atrociously 
tyrannical manner. I had harshly worn down the land of St Peter, that 
is to say Emprainville and the places around it, in the way that had 
become customary, by seizing the goods of the inhabitants there. This 
was the rough nature of the custom. Whenever the onset of knightly 
ferocity stirred me up, I used to descend on the aforesaid village, tak-
ing with me a troop of my knights and a crowd of my attendants, and 
against nature I would make over the goods of the men of St Peter for 
food for my knights.1
Thus a French nobleman named Nivello expressed himself in a charter issued 
in 1096 in favour of the monastery of St Peter at Chartres, in which he stated 
his intention to join the great expedition proclaimed by Pope Urban II at the 
council of Clermont in Auvergne in November 1095, which was intended 
to liberate Jerusalem and the Holy Land from Turkish rule. The wording of 
the charter, with its judgemental tone, must have been formulated by the 
monks who undoubtedly wrote it rather than by Nivello himself, but there is 
no reason to doubt that his contrition for his past misdeeds was genuine; in 
exchange for an agreement that he and his heirs would cease despoliation of 
the monastery and its dependents, the monks paid him the sum of 10 pounds 
towards the expenses of the journey and gave smaller amounts of money to 
other members of his family. The circumstances described in the charter en-
capsulate the reasons why in attempting to raise an army for what became 
AlAn v. MurrAy 
Warriors and Civilians in the Crusade Movement
1 Chronicles of the First Crusade, ed. C. TYERMAN (London, Penguin, 2004), pp. 28-29.
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known as the First Crusade (1096-99), Urban II appealed primarily to the 
class of knights (milites) and by implication, their noble masters, in a man-
ner which was intended to provide aid for Christianity in the Near East, but 
also to address fundamental social problems in Western Europe. 
Understandably, the study of military aspects of the crusades has been pri-
marily concerned with strategy and tactics, the course and mechanics of 
battles and sieges, and more recently, logistics.2 Other aspects which touch 
on the character of those Westerners who fought on crusades are motivation 
and individual (as opposed to institutional) finance.3 However, the question 
of military identities has been less studied, one reason that being that defini-
tions such as “warriors” or “professionals” and “civilians” or “non-combat-
ants” are problematic and often fluid.4 This essay will attempt to contribute 
to the study of military identities by exploring the social dichotomy between 
military elites and popular elements and the manner in which the balance 
between the two shifted in the course of 150 years of crusades to the Levant. 
2 Bibliography on these topics is extensive. Some of the most fundamental studies are: SMAIL, R.C. 
(1995): Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193, 2nd edn. ed. C. MARSHAL. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press; FRANCE, J. (1994): Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; FRANCE, J. (1999): Western Warfare in the Age of the 
Crusades, 1000-1300. London, UCL; FRANCE, J. (2005): “Crusading Warfare”. NICHOLSON, 
H. (ed.), Palgrave Advances in the Crusades. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan; FRANCE, J. 
(2006): “Thinking about Crusader Strategy”. CHRISTIE, N. and YAZIGI, M. (eds.), Noble Ideals 
and Bloody Realities: Warfare in the Middle Ages. Leiden, Brill, pp. 75-96; FRANCE, J. (2011): 
“Warfare in the Mediterranean Region in the Age of the Crusades, 1095-1291: A Clash of Con-
trasts”. KOSTICK, C. (ed.), The Crusades and the Near East. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 9-26; 
PRYOR, J. (1992): Geography, Technology and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Medi-
terranean, 649-1571. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; PRYOR, J. (ed.) (2006); Logistics 
of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades. Aldershot, Ashgate; TYERMAN, C. (2015): How to Plan a 
Crusade: Reason and Religious War in the High Middle Ages. London, Allen Lane, 2015. Other 
key works are cited at appropriate points in the discussion below.
3 CONSTABLE, G. (1982): “The Financing of the Crusades in the Twelfth Century”. KEDAR, B.Z., 
MAYER, H.E. and SMAIL, R.C. (eds.), Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom 
of Jerusalem. Jerusalem, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, pp. 64-88; RILEY-SMITH, J. (1986): The First 
Crusade and the Idea of Crusading. London, Athlone; RILEY-SMITH, J. (1995): “Early Crusaders 
and the Costs of Crusading, 1095-1130”. GOODICH, M., MENACHE, S. and SCHEIN, S. 
(eds.), Cross Cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period. New York, Peter Lang, pp. 237-258; 
RILEY-SMITH, J. (1997): The First Crusaders, 1095-1131. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
4 PORGES, W. (1946): “The Clergy, the Poor and the Non-Combatants on the First Crusade”, 
Speculum, nº 21, pp. 1-23; KOSTICK, C. (2013): “Courage and Cowardice in the First Crusade, 
1096-1099”, War in History, nº 20, pp. 32-49.
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In what follows the terms “warriors” and “soldiers” are employed to denote 
people who had received training in fighting techniques and discipline, and 
who earned their living primarily by military activity. The term “civilians” is 
used to denote those who did not engage in military activities in the course 
of their everyday lives, at least up to the point that they joined forces bound 
for the East. However, it shall become evident that these categories did not 
remain hard and fast during the course of crusade expeditions, whose char-
acter often obscured distinctions which might have been clear cut in other 
contexts. Further clarification will be given in the course of more detailed 
discussion.
Urban’s call to crusade at Clermont came in response to appeals from the 
Byzantine emperor, Alexios I Komnenos, who wished to stem the Turkish ad-
vance into Syria and Asia Minor after the collapse of Byzantine resistance 
in the wake of the defeat of his predecessor Romanos IV Diogenes at the 
hands of the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan at Manzikert in eastern Anatolia in 
1071. Alexios had already employed Western knights in his service, both 
individually and in regiments, such as a contingent of 500 knights sent by 
the count of Flanders. These men constituted mercenaries in one of the most 
generally accepted senses of the word, in that they were soldiers who had 
left their home country to serve a foreign power for pay. Such a basis for 
service was quite common in the Byzantine army, which employed Varang-
ians, Slavs, Armenians, Turkic peoples and Westerners (generally known 
as Franks) alongside native Greeks, and this form of military service was 
much more similar to modern military practice than the armed forces of 
contemporary Western Europe, which were largely recruited on the basis of 
feudo-vassalic obligations.5 Evidently Alexios hoped for much greater num-
bers of such experienced soldiers who would fight alongside the Byzantine 
army, but the use of mercenaries, in the sense just defined, proved to be 
practically non-existent in the course of the crusades to the Holy Land.6 The 
Western perspective was different. Pope Urban must have realised that aid 
for Byzantium probably had only a limited appeal among Western Chris-
tians, and so he coupled his call to crusade with the aim of freeing the Holy 
Land and its Christian population from Turkish rule, thus combining the idea 
of holy war with pilgrimage to the most sacred sites in the Christian faith. 
5 BIRKENMEIER, J. (2002): The Development of the Komnenian Army, 1081-1180. Leiden, Brill, 
pp. 77-158.
6 SHEPARD, J. (1997): “Cross-Purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade”. PHILLIPS, J. 
(ed.), The First Crusade: Origins and Impact. Manchester, Manchester University Press, pp. 107-
129. For a recent discussion of mercenaries see: FRANCE, J. (ed.) (2008): Mercenaries and Paid 
Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages. Leiden, Brill.
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The response which it brought forth gave rise to a form of warfare which 
was completely new in terms of the social makeup of those who volunteered 
to fight in it.
It is clear from all contemporary accounts of the council of Clermont that in 
his appeal, Urban was addressing himself to the knightly class of Western 
Europe. We must remember that at this time the status of knight was not 
yet imbued with the ideology and ethos of the cultural phenomenon that in 
retrospect came to be called “chivalry”. This new idea of chivalry began 
to develop in the later twelfth century under the influence of the Arthurian 
romances of Chrétien de Troyes and his successors as well as religious re-
formers, so that by the thirteenth century most members of the higher nobility 
and royal families were happy to be described as knights and undergo 
knighting ceremonies, even though there was a vast social gulf between a 
count or duke and a simple knight in possession of a small country estate or 
serving in a castle garrison. What was happening here was a development 
of the concept of knighthood, which was being extended far beyond its 
original meaning. At the time of the council of Clermont, things were very 
different, however. Knights formed a military and managerial caste in the 
service of kings, bishops, dukes, counts and lords, who employed them in 
numbers ranging from dozens (as was probably the case with the French-
man Nivello) to many hundreds, as in the cases of the princes of the Holy 
Roman empire and the great vassals of the kings of France. Fighting on 
horseback, armed with lance and sword and protected by a hauberk (coat 
of mail), helmet and shield, the knight was the dominant element in Western 
military forces in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.7 
Knights served in all manner of conflicts, ranging from small-scale raiding to 
sieges and major wars. As a social group which exercised a near monopo-
ly of violence, knights also had a propensity to feuding amongst themselves 
and to despoiling easy targets. In most of these cases it was institutions or 
groups which rarely had the means to defend themselves (such as monasteries 
or peasants) that suffered the most. Nivello and his followers clearly had 
military experience that would make them useful on crusade, but according 
7 BUMKE, J. (1982): The Concept of Knighthood in the Middle Ages. New York, AMS Press; FLORI, 
J. (1998): Chevaliers et chevalerie au Moyen Age. Paris, Hachette. The chronicler Gilbert of 
Mons gives credible figures for the knightly retinues of princes of the Holy Roman empire in the 
twelfth century, ranging from 500 each for the duke of Austria and the abbot of Fulda to 1000 
or more for the count palatine of the Rhine, the landgrave of Thuringia and the archbishop of 
Cologne. See Gilbert of Mons, Chronicle of Hainaut, trans. L. NAPRAN (Woodbridge, Boydell 
Press, 2005), esp. pp. 87-88.
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to his confession, they had regularly plundered the estates and dependents 
of the monastery of St Peter. It was Pope Urban’s idea to channel and divert 
this destructive and senseless violence towards a more laudable and deserving 
purpose by recruiting the knights of the West as the principal force in his 
expedition to recover the Holy Land. As the monk Robert of Rheims phrased 
it in his account of Urban’s speech at Clermont:
“Let those”, he [Urban] said, “who are accustomed wantonly to wage private 
war against the faithful march upon the infidels in a war which should be 
begun now and be finished in victory. Let those who have long been robbers 
now be soldiers of Christ. Let those who once fought against brothers and 
relatives now rightfully fight against barbarians. Let those who have been 
hirelings for a few pieces of silver now attain an eternal reward. Let those 
who have been exhausting themselves to the detriment of body and soul 
now labour for a double glory”.8
Urban envisaged the participation of a number of clerics to provide reli-
gious leadership and spiritual guidance. They included his chosen leader, 
Adhemar, bishop of Le Puy, and a number of other bishops (especially 
from southern France). However, he expected the bulk of the forthcoming 
crusade to be made up of secular lords and their entourages of knights, a 
combination for which modern scholarship has devised the overarching 
term armsbearers. In a letter to the monks of Vallombrosa sent on 7 Octo-
ber 1096, Urban stated that he had intended to persuade knights to join 
the expedition, but that he was concerned that “the wrong kind of person” 
– meaning priests and monks – wanted to set out with them.9 In practice 
neither Urban’s commands nor monastic discipline prevented a number of 
priests, monks and even nuns joining the expedition, but these came to 
be vastly outnumbered by lay people from beyond the noble and knightly 
warrior classes.
For the church, the ideal way to fight for the faith had been to live as a 
monk, a lifestyle that was ill-suited to the majority of believers. What was 
new about Urban’s plan for the crusade was that anyone could fight for 
the faith in a real sense. Knights who had been condemned by the church 
for their violent lifestyles could now deploy their military skills in the service 
of the faith, and gain spiritual benefits in doing so. However, in practice 
it proved impossible to restrict participation to knights. Urban proclaimed 
the expedition as a pilgrimage, an institution which had traditionally been 
8 Chronicles of the First Crusade, p. 10.
9 Chronicles of the First Crusade, pp. 26-27.
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open to all classes. As the primary incentive, the Pope offered a remission 
of sins to all who went to the Holy Sepulchre, the traditional site of Christ’s 
burial, death and Resurrection. The precise nature of this indulgence has 
been much debated by historians, but the important thing is that thousands 
of people regarded it as an unrepeatable offer in which they could rid them-
selves of the consequences of sin in the afterlife. The prospect of this won-
derful spiritual bargain meant that members of all social classes joined up 
by taking the sign of the cross: men, women and children; old and young; 
rich and poor; free and unfree; townspeople and peasants; laypeople, cler-
ics and monks.10
1.2. princes’ Crusades and popular Crusades
The practicalities of recruitment of crusaders over most of France, the Low 
Countries, western Germany, northern Italy and the British Isles meant that 
the large number of crusaders who responded to Urban’s appeal formed 
themselves into over a dozen different contingents which travelled separate-
ly to the East, but it is important to recognise that these can be regarded as 
belonging to two distinctive types of units in terms of their composition and 
leadership. 
The majority of crusaders spent many months preparing for their journey, using 
the time following the council of Clermont to raise the necessary finance, 
put their affairs in order, and make contact with potential companions, with 
the aim of leaving on or near the official departure date of the Feast of the 
Assumption (15 August 1096). Command in crusade armies was based on 
social rank rather than military ability, although the nature of Western soci-
ety meant that most of the great lords who figured as commanders already 
had experience of warfare. This meant that most crusaders, whether singly 
or (more probably) in small groups of kinsfolk, acquaintances or fellow 
workers, coalesced around a number of great lords, whose status meant 
that their leadership was necessarily accepted by those who aimed to travel 
with them: Raymond of Saint-Giles, count of Toulouse; Godfrey of Bouil-
lon, duke of Lower Lotharingia; Stephen-Henry, count of Blois, and Hugh, 
count of Vermandois; Robert II, count of Flanders, and Robert Curthose, 
10 KOSTICK, C. (2008): The Social Structure of the First Crusade. Leiden, Brill; MURRAY, A.V. 
(2012): “Sex, Death and the Problem of Single Women in the Armies of the First Crusade”. 
GERTWAGEN, R. and JEFFREYS, E. (eds.), Shipping, Trade and Crusade in the Medieval Medi-
terranean: Studies in Honour of John Pryor. Farnham, Ashgate, pp. 255-270.
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duke of Normandy.11 The contingents led by these lords are now generally 
referred to as “princes’ crusades”. In their composition and recruitment, 
each of these armies (each generally referred to in the sources by the Latin 
noun exercitus) can be thought of a series of concentric circles. The central 
element was the princely household. Beyond this were various lords and 
knights who were connected with the leader by ties of kinship or vassalage, 
together with their own dependents, while on the periphery were others 
whose ties were much looser, being based on regional identity or linguistic 
affiliation.12 This scheme can be illustrated in terms of the composition of the 
army of Godfrey of Bouillon. At its core were Godfrey himself, his brother 
Baldwin of Boulogne and Baldwin’s wife Godevere, along with household 
officials of knightly rank, who included a seneschal, a butler, and chamber-
lain, while Baldwin had a secretary who was probably a cleric. This central 
element also included a number of Bullonienses, that is, knights who held 
fiefs in Godfrey’s allodial territory of Bouillon in the Ardennes, who included 
the castellan of Bouillon, one Heribrand. Beyond them were a number of 
lords from neighbouring areas of Lower Lotharingia and the northern part 
of the kingdom of France, many of whom were linked to Godfrey and Bald-
win by ties of kinship: Warner, count of Grez; Cuno, count of Montaigu, 
and his sons Gozelo and Lambert; Henry and Godfrey of Esch-sur-la-Sûre; 
Baldwin of Mons, count of Hainaut; Dudo, lord of Cons-la-Grandville; Peter 
of Dampierre, count of Astenois, and his brother Rainald, count of Toul; 
and Baldwin, lord of Bourcq. Each of these lords must have had his own 
retinue of knights, grooms and other servants. Beyond them was a less 
easily discernable group of laymen and clerics, many of them from urban 
environments, who included Adalbero of Luxembourg, archdeacon of Metz, 
and others from the region, as well as those who joined Godfrey from areas 
that his army passed through on its journey to the East, such as Reinhold 
of Helmarshausen in Hesse, or Hartmann, count of Dillingen and Kyburg in 
Upper Swabia.13
11  The Italian-Norman leader Bohemund later led a contingent of Normans and Lombards, but I 
have argued that his decision to join the crusade was largely opportunistic and occurred only af-
ter the contingents from north of the Alps were passing through Italy. See: MURRAY, A.V. (2015): 
“The Enemy Within: Bohemond, Byzantium and the Subversion of the First Crusade”. HURLOCK, 
K. and OLDFIELD, P. (eds.), Crusading and Pilgrimage in the Norman World. Woodbridge, 
Boydell & Brewer, pp. 31–47.
12  MURRAY, A.V. (2011): “National Identity, Language and Conflict in the Crusades to the Holy 
Land, 1096–1192”. KOSTICK, The Crusades and the Near East, pp. 107–130.
13 MURRAY, A.V. (1992): “The Army of Godfrey of Bouillon, 1096–1099: Structure and Dynam-
ics of a Contingent on the First Crusade”. Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, nº 70, pp. 
301–329.
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Yet long before the princes’ crusades set off, other groups were already 
on the move which were more popular in composition and less hierarchi-
cal in their organisation. Their leadership was not based on status and 
authority, as in the case of the princes’ expeditions, but on the personal 
charisma and promises of those who led them. The wandering preacher 
Peter the Hermit attracted numerous followers from central and northern 
France, primarily though the effectiveness of his preaching, and the priest 
Gottschalk had a similar response in the Rhineland. Others who responded 
to appeals were more obviously driven by cupidity. Emicho, count of Flon-
heim, collected a large number of followers from the central Rhineland, who 
combined with other crusaders coming from the West to attack and despoil 
the Jews of Mainz.14 These and other similarly organised groups were at 
one time referred to as “Peasants’ Crusades”, although this designation 
has now largely been set aside as misleading. Nevertheless, they seem to 
have included far fewer members of the noble and knightly classes than the 
princes’ expeditions; indeed, it is scarcely conceivable that members of the 
higher nobility, who were used to exercising command, would have been 
willing to accept the leadership of simple priests or preachers such as Peter 
the Hermit. Peter’s army eventually absorbed other groups from the Ile-de-
France, northern France and western Germany, and while these included 
knights such as Walter Sans-Avoir (from Boissy-sans-Avoir near Paris) and 
others from his kin group, the relative paucity of named individuals in the 
sources suggests that it predominantly consisted of townspeople, peasants 
and other country dwellers.15
Most of these popular groups, as well as others from northern Italy, were 
already in motion by the spring of 1096. Since their participants were 
generally poorer than those of the princes’ crusades and had spent little 
time in preparation, they were obliged to recruit additional members and 
secure funds and provisions on the move as they marched east, through a 
combination of appeals to charity, plundering and extortion, particularly 
through despoliation of the Jewish communities of Germany and Bohemia. 
The lawlessness and indiscipline which they exhibited resulted in most of 
them being violently dispersed by German or Hungarian authorities. Only 
a minority reached Constantinople and crossed into Asia Minor, but after a 
14 FLORI, J. (1999): Pierre l’Ermite et la Première Croisade. Paris, Fayard; MÖHRING, H. (1992): 
“Graf Emicho und die Judenverfolgungen von 1096”. Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter, nº 56, pp. 
97-111.
15 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana: History of the Journey to Jerusalem, ed. and trans. S. 
B. EDGINGTON (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 1-5, 8-17, 44-53.
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crushing defeat by the Turks of the sultanate of Rūm in the autumn of 1096, 
the pitiful survivors had little choice but to attach themselves to the princes’ 
expeditions. 
1.3. problems of Definition: professionals and Civilians in the first 
Crusade
The diverse contingents which assembled on the Asian shore and marched 
towards Nicaea in early 1097 numbered in total perhaps some 50,000–
60,000 men, women and children.16 The vast majority of them (as well as 
those in subsequent expeditions) were volunteers, in the sense that they had 
voluntarily taken public vows to travel to Jerusalem, reflected in the sign 
of the cross worn on their clothing. However, we should remember that in 
this labour-intensive age not only nobles, but many others of much humbler 
status could afford to maintain personal servants, who may well have had 
little choice but to accompany their masters. In terms of their experience of 
war, participants can be roughly divided into two categories. On the one 
hand were the armsbearers, that is, members of the nobility and their reti-
nues of mounted knights. Most of these would have needed grooms, while 
the wealthier ones were probably accompanied by other specialists such as 
armourers, farriers and falconers, as well as contingents of footsoldiers with 
varying degrees of protective equipment. On the other hand there were sig-
nificant numbers of peasants, labourers, artisans, domestic servants, as well 
as clerics and other religious. These can be classified – for want of a better 
word – as civilians, meaning that they had no experience of warfare in their 
lives prior to their participation in a crusade, except perhaps, that some of 
them may have previously been on the receiving end of knightly violence. 
It is difficult to map such categories onto classifications such as profession-
als, mercenaries or non-combatants, whose definitions have essentially 
been driven by military experience in the post-medieval world, and in more 
recent times, by laws and conventions. Since around the late fifteenth or 
sixteenth centuries, professional soldiers can be defined by a number of 
characteristics which have by and large been maintained up to the present. 
At its most basic, this form of professionalism required that its practitioners 
had to undergo training in using weapons and moving in formation on the 
battlefield, a circumstance which presupposes the existence of a recognised 
system of drill and commands. To this we can add the acceptance of a hi-
erarchy of military ranks and uniforms (at least within single units). Several 
of these features were already present among the landsknechts and Swiss 
16  FRANCE, Victory in the East, pp. 122– 142.
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pikemen and halberdiers of the later Middle Ages, as well as the Spanish 
tercios of the sixteenth century, and they continued to be characteristic of 
modern armies, whether these were primarily formed from volunteers (as in 
the British and French armies of the eighteenth century) or conscripts, as in 
the military systems of eighteenth-century Prussia and the national armies of 
most of continental Europe in the period after the French Revolution. 
It is no coincidence that all of these modern examples related primarily to 
footsoldiers, who required drill and ordered formations to function effective-
ly, but who also needed to be more amenable to such discipline than were 
cavalrymen. Armies of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries were domi-
nated by mounted knights, but there were few formal methods of training 
that resembled those of modern forces. The most essential attribute for a 
knight was to be able to ride a horse from an early age and wield spear, 
sword and shield while doing so. The effectiveness of the charge depended 
on maintaining a tight formation with knights riding knee to knee, and al-
though some had the opportunity to practice manoeuvres in tourneys, most 
knights would have learned to fight in formation through real experience 
and practice. 
The distinction between combatants and civilians which prevailed at the 
beginning of the First Crusade became progressively blurred by conditions 
which developed in the course of the long march to Jerusalem. The status 
of knights depended not only on their military experience and skills, but 
also on their possession of horses and equipment, which enabled them to 
fight in an effective manner. Most military conflicts in the West at this time 
were relatively limited in their objectives and thus restricted in time. By con-
trast, the duration of the First Crusade – from departure in August 1096 to 
the capture of Jerusalem in July 1099 – had effects which all but the most 
seasoned participants would have rarely experienced in campaigning in 
their home countries. During the crossing of the Anatolian plateau, many 
horses died either as a result of starvation and thirst or from being slaugh-
tered for food by the equally starving crusaders. During the privation of 
the siege of Antioch, which lasted through the winter and spring of 1097-
1098, many crusaders sold their possessions to buy food. Horses, and 
armour and weapons that had been captured, lost or became unusable 
were difficult to replace many thousands of kilometres away from home, 
which affected status as well as the ability to fight. One vivid example can 
illustrate this phenomenon. During the siege of Nicaea (1097), Hartmann, 
count of Dillingen and Kyburg, had sufficient spare funds to part finance the 
construction of a siege engine. Yet within a year he had sold his horse and 
armour, and was riding an ass and fighting with captured Turkish weapons. 
He was dependent on Godfrey of Bouillon for a daily ration of food, which 
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meant that he was probably no longer able to maintain the retinue that 
must have originally accompanied him. One of the richest men in southern 
Germany had been reduced to the status of a simple footsoldier, and many 
other lords and knights were in the position of dependents of the princes, 
who were better placed to secure forage and tribute by virtue of their role 
as field commanders and organisers.17
At the same time the requirements placed on civilians meant that many of 
them were gradually being transformed into soldiers. The crusade army was 
divided into a number of contingents, each led by one of the princes, which 
marched separately, and each of these units seems to have organised its 
own foraging and provisioning. This meant that civilians had little choice 
but to accept the orders and discipline imposed by those in command. It is 
difficult to train an adult civilian to fight on horseback, which is why knights 
learned to ride while still in their youth, but a civilian could be made into 
an infantry soldier given the requirements of the campaign. The crusaders 
fought pitched battles against highly mobile Turkish horsemen at Dorylaion 
(July 1097), Albara (December 1097) and at Antioch (February and June 
1098), who were more mobile than the crusader cavalry. However, in most 
of these cases a significant role was played by the crusader infantry, whose 
effectiveness increased progressively. Yet a greater amount of time was 
spent in lengthy sieges of a succession of Muslim-held cities: Nicaea (May-
June 1097), Antioch (October 1097 – June 1098), Ma‘arrat al-Numan 
(November-December 1098), ‘Akkar (April-May 1099), and Jerusalem 
(June-July 1099). In these situations knights had to fight dismounted, and 
infantrymen had to carry out a wide range of tasks: going on foraging par-
ties, sourcing building materials and constructing ladders and other siege 
equipment, doing sentry duty and guarding prisoners, and in many cases, 
taking part in assaults. This all meant that by the summer of 1099, when 
Jerusalem was finally taken, most of the originally civilian crusaders had 
probably learned to wield weapons, follow orders and maintain disciple, 
and keep formation where required. It was this cohesion acquired over 
several years that enabled the crusader army, despite being much reduced 
in numbers, to win its final victory over a numerically superior Fātimid army 
on the coastal plain outside Ascalon in August 1099.18
17 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, pp. 332–334; MURRAY, A.V. (2006): “Money and 
Logistics in the Armies of the First Crusade: Coinage, Bullion, Service and Supply, 1096–99”. 
PRYOR, Logistics of Warfare, pp. 229–249.
18 MURRAY, A.V. (2017): “A Race against Time – A Fight to the Death: Combatants and Civilians in 
the Siege and Capture of Jerusalem”. DOWDALL, A. and HOME, J. (eds.), Civilians under Siege 
from Sarajevo to Troy. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming.
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2. the DefenCe of the holy lAnD
2.1. the frankish Hosts
The majority of crusaders probably returned to the West in the summer of 
1099, but those lords and knights who remained went on to constitute the 
military and administrative classes of the four new principalities established 
by the crusade: the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the coun-
ty of Tripoli and the kingdom of Jerusalem, known collectively to Western 
Christians as Outremer.19 It is also likely – although difficult to demonstrate 
with certainty – that many of those who had fought in the crusade as footsol-
diers remained to follow military professions in the new homeland.
The opponents of the Frankish states of Outremer were mostly Turkish (or in 
the case of Saladin, Kurdish) rulers or warlords. The main element in their 
military forces were professional mounted soldiers (known as mamlūks or 
ghūlams), recruited mostly from Turks or Kurds, but with small numbers from 
other ethnic groups; each was normally equipped with a mail coat, spear, 
sword, shield and the composite bow. This core force was usually augment-
ed by nomadic Türkmen tribesmen, fighting in a similar manner but with less 
armour, while Turkish leaders who controlled major cities such as Aleppo 
or Damascus could also deploy militias of footsoldiers drawn from the pre-
dominantly Arab urban populations.20 By contrast, the Fātimid caliphs of 
Egypt employed multi-ethnic forces which proved much less effective against 
the Franks; these were disbanded and replaced by mamlūks when Saladin 
overthrew the caliphate in 1171. The key element in Frankish armies was 
the knights, who were used to deliver a devastating charge, a tactic which 
the Muslim forces feared and did not try to replicate themselves. The main 
Turkish tactic was to move close and use archery to wear down the Frankish 
troops; feigned retreats were also used in the hope of breaking up Frank-
ish formations. This meant that the Franks had to employ large numbers of 
trained infantry to hold the army’s position and protect the knights and their 
19 RICHARD, J. (1989): “La noblesse de Terre Sainte (1097-1187”. Arquivos do Centro cultural 
português, nº 26, pp. 321-336; MURRAY, A.V. (1989): “The Origins of the Frankish Nobility of 
the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100–1118”. Mediterranean Historical Review, nº 4, pp. 281–300; 
MURRAY, A.V. (1997): “How Norman was the Principality of Antioch? Prolegomena to a Study 
of the Origins of the Nobility of a Crusader State”. KEATS-ROHAN, K.S.B. (ed.), Family Trees and 
the Roots of Politics: The Prosopography of Britain and France from the Tenth to the Twelfth Cen-
tury. Woodbridge, Boydell & Brewer, pp. 349–359; MURRAY, A.V. (2009): “Norman Settlement 
in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1099–1131”. Archivio Normanno-Svevo, nº 1, pp. 61–85.
20 HILLENBRAND, C. (1999): The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, pp. 431-467.
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valuable warhorses until the point that the charge could be unleashed. 
A list detailing the military service of the kingdom of Jerusalem shortly before 
its great defeat by Saladin at the battle of Hattin in 1187 was preserved in 
the Livre des Assises, a treatise of laws and customs compiled by John of 
Ibelin, count of Jaffa (d. 1266). It gives the total service available to the king 
as some 675 knights and 5025 sergeants.21 The sergeants were provided 
by the bishoprics and the urban communities and were most probably foot-
soldiers, although some may have served on horseback in lighter equipment 
than the knights. It is likely that the sergeants were full-time professional sol-
diers, although we cannot exclude the possibility that they were members of 
the burgess class who were obliged to perform military service as necessity 
dictated as a condition of their tenures. Experts have argued that the num-
ber of knights given by John of Ibelin was considerably lower than the size 
of the greatest Frankish armies would suggest, and that his figures represent-
ed only the service that lords were obliged to provide to the Crown. Thus 
the count of Jaffa and the lords of Tiberias and Sidon each owed the service 
of 100 knights, with smaller lordships providing lesser numbers. In actual 
fact many lords, especially those who held fiefs in frontier areas, probably 
enfeoffed greater numbers than their own obligations demanded,22 which 
meant that more soldiers were available than were enumerated in the Livre 
des Assises. A large number of knights were also maintained directly by the 
Crown through an institution known as the money-fief (French: fief-rente). 
These men did not hold landed fiefs, but were remunerated directly in cash 
out of royal revenues. Palestine was a money economy, and there was 
generally more coin in circulation than in Western Europe. The money-fiefs 
in Palestine may have originated as a result of tribute paid by Muslim-held 
cities to Frankish rulers, who used this income to remunerate many of their 
vassals. All of the Muslim cities in Palestine were in Frankish hands by 
1125 except for Ascalon (which fell in 1153), and from this time most of 
the money-fiefs were probably paid out of customs revenues accruing to the 
Crown in the demesne cities of Acre and Tyre, and to a lesser extent, other 
revenues in territories of Nablus and the city of Jerusalem.23
21 EDBURY, P.W. (1997): John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Woodbridge, Boydell, pp. 
118-154.
22 EDBURY: John of Ibelin, p. 131; FRANCE, J. (2000): “Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to 
Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century”. Mediterranean Historical Review, nº 15, pp. 49-56.
23  MURRAY, A.V. (2008): “The Origin of Money-Fiefs in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem”. FRANCE, 
Mercenaries and Paid Men, pp. 275–286.
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The nobles and knights of Outremer formed a hereditary caste of Euro-
pean origin, although there was probably less of a divide between the 
two groups than in the West; because of a general shortage of manpower 
several relatively lowly or otherwise obscure knights were able to acquire 
fairly important lordships, especially in the first few decades after the First 
Crusade. Another important difference was that in the West the service of 
vassals to their lords was becoming limited by custom to 40 days in the 
year, but in Jerusalem service in defence of the kingdom was unlimited, and 
the same probably applied in the other states. By contrast, when kings such 
as Amalric (1163-1174) campaigned in Egypt, they were obliged to offer 
their vassals financial inducements to take part in expeditions outside the 
kingdom. 
Much less is known about the forces of the northern states of Antioch, Trip-
oli and Edessa (especially since the last named had fallen to the Turks by 
1150, leaving few surviving sources). However, one significant difference 
compared to the kingdom of Jerusalem is that the Franks of Syria made 
extensive use of native Christians in their armies. Unlike conditions in Pal-
estine, where native Christians had lost their upper classes in the course 
of Muslim invasions, the Armenians of Upper Mesopotamia and Cilicia 
and the Greeks of Syria still had a class of nobles, chieftains and warriors, 
many of whom served the Franks as soldiers and administrators. Thus one 
Euterpius, described as a ‘most worthy knight in physical and mental strife’, 
was killed fighting against the Turks at the battle known as the Field of 
Blood (Ager Sanguinis) in 1119. This name is undoubtedly of Greek origin 
and is unknown among Western populations.24 Vassals of the Mazoir lords 
of Margat, named in a charter of Prince Bohemund III of Antioch dating 
from 1186, include two men named Amelin and Baldwin who were clearly 
Franks, but also two Easterners with Greek names, George and Theodore. 
The fact that they are explicitly described as knights and also given the title 
dominus clearly indicates that they were part of the Mazoir family’s military 
retinue and were more than simple footsoldiers.25 Similarly, the Maronites 
of the Lebanon mountains had maintained military traditions in centuries of 
resistance to Muslim invaders, and provided soldiers (notably archers) to 
the counts of Tripoli.26 Both Antioch and Jerusalem employed considerable 
24 Walter the Chancellor, Galterii Cancelarii Bella Antiochena, ed. H. HAGENMEYER (Innsbruck, 
Wagner, 1896), p. 90.
25 RÖHRICHT, R. (ed.), Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani, 2 vols. (Innsbruck, Wagner, 1893-1904), 
no. 649. Another of this group, Dominus Zacharias, may also have been an Eastern Christian.
26 SALIBI, K.S. (1957): “The Maronites of Lebanon under Frankish and Mamluk Rule (1099-1516)”. 
Arabica, nº 4, pp. 280-303.
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numbers of light cavalry known as Turcopoles, a name deriving from the 
Greek τουρκοπουλοι. This term was used to denote Turkish mercenaries in 
Byzantine service, but in Outremer it is unclear whether these were really 
Turks, or were possibly Eastern Christians fighting in the Turkish manner.27 A 
private charter issued in 1180 gives a list of witnesses described as Turco-
puli, one of whom is named as Gaifredus Baptizatus. The second element of 
this name suggests that he had converted to Christianity, and had taken the 
Western name Gaifredus (Geoffrey) on that occasion. The names Godfrey 
and Gormund are clearly Western in origin, while the names Peter, John 
and Andrew were popular among both Western and Eastern Christians. 
The fact that one is named along with his son indicates that the Turcopoles 
could also be a hereditary profession, although the evidence of names 
appearing in this charter suggests that they were a fairly diverse group.28
The principalities of Outremer were perennially short of manpower. Even 
when garrisons in castles and towns had been reduced to an absolute min-
imum, each state could only put a single host into the field, which was in-
variably smaller than invading Muslim forces. Commanders were thus often 
reluctant to risk this army, since if it was defeated – as happened against 
Saladin at the battle of Hattin in 1187 – there would be no sizeable forces 
left to combat the Muslims. In order to increase available numbers, rulers 
and holders of lordships seem to have augmented their vassals by employ-
ing knights who served purely for pay. The notorious Rainald of Châtillon, 
who rose to become prince of Antioch and later lord of Transjordan, and 
died at the hands of Saladin after being captured at Hattin, first appeared in 
the Holy Land holding a stipendium (a stipend or salary) from King Baldwin 
III of Jerusalem (1145-1163) at the siege of Ascalon in 1153. Rainald does 
not seem to have taken a crusade vow, but left France and took service with 
the king of Jerusalem for regular pay. By most definitions, he was a merce-
nary.29 This category of hired men becomes clearer in a charter issued in 
1158 by Amalric, then count of Ascalon and later king of Jerusalem, which 
was witnessed by three groups of men of knightly rank. They are respective-
27 Walter the Chancellor, Galterii Cancelarii Bella Antiochena, pp. 74, 84, 88; RICHARD, J. 
(1986): “Les Turcoples au service des royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre: Musulmans convertis 
ou chrétiens orientaux?”. Revue des études islamiques, nº 54, pp. 259-270.
28 RÖHRICHT, Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani, no. 594: Gaifredus Baptizatus, Durantus Scutifer, 
Petrus, filius ejus, magister Godofredus, Petrus de Capharset, Petrus Lorgius, Arnulfus, Stephanus 
Rex, Silvester de Sapharia, Gormundus, Andreas, Bonettus Salvagius, Johannes Sansan.
29 Guillaume de Tyre, Chronique, ed. R.B.C. HUYGENS, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medi-
aevalis 63-63A, 2 vols. (Turnhout, Brepols, 1986), p. 790.
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ly described by Amalric as homines mei, meaning his own vassals in the 
county of Ascalon; homines regis, that is vassals of his brother Baldwin III; 
and finally stipendiarii mei, who must thus have been mercenaries serving 
Amalric for pay, rather than holding fiefs like the homines.30
2.2. the Military Monastic orders
It was the requirements of the defence of the Holy Land that brought forth 
one of the most novel and distinctive types of warrior in European history. In 
1119—1120 a number of knights living in Palestine dedicated themselves 
to the protection of pilgrims travelling between their points of arrival on the 
coast and the holy sites in and around Jerusalem. By 1129 the Templars, as 
they became known, had been granted a rule, making them into a religious 
organisation similar to existing orders of monks, but what was revolutionary 
was that they were permitted and indeed, expected to fight for the Christian 
faith. In categorising the knight brethren of the military order it is difficult 
to apply modern concepts of professionalism. We tend to think of a profes-
sional soldier as someone who has made a career of service in the military, 
and while the Templar (and members of other orders) dedicated his life to 
the knighthood of Christ by fighting against the enemies of Christianity, 
he combined this service with the lifestyle of a monk. Traditional monastic 
orders were organised around the celebration of the liturgy, prayer, contem-
plation and manual work, a combination which did not necessarily appeal 
to men from the knightly classes who had been brought up to ride, fight and 
hunt; membership of the Order of the Temple allowed them to combine a 
religious vocation with a military lifestyle which would have been familiar 
to them. Thus Templars profited from their service not in material, but in 
spiritual terms, yet despite their formal status as monks they were probably 
the most dedicated form of soldier in medieval Christendom. Indeed, a Tem-
plar made a profession at the time of his entry into the order, when he took 
vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. He was subjected to severe forms 
of discipline, both on campaign and in everyday life, with punishments for 
infringements of vows as well as for actions that threatened the cohesion of 
the order’s units in wartime. The fact that this quite innovative organisational 
form was accepted by the papacy and the wider church owed a great deal 
to the support of the influential Cistercian theologian Bernard of Clairvaux, 
notably in his treatise written in its support, De laude novae militiae (In 
Praise of New Knighthood). What Bernard meant by “new knighthood” 
30 MAYER, H.E. (ed.), Die Urkunden der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem, 4 vols. (Hannover, 
Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2010), 1, no. 298.
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was a pure form of knightly life in the service of the faith, in contrast to what 
he perceived as the older, sinful and destructive lifestyle of secular knights. 
It could thus be said that the development of the military monastic order was 
a logical consequence of the vision of Christian knighthood proclaimed by 
Urban II at the council of Clermont.31 
The appeal of this new institution can be seen from the fact that new orders 
sprang up on the Templar model in Outremer, Iberia and the Baltic region. 
Meanwhile the Order of the Hospital, originally a purely charitable and 
medical organisation, had by the 1160s restructured itself to become a mil-
itary order, while retaining its original hospitaller functions. A similar devel-
opment occurred with the Order of St Mary of the Germans, founded as a 
hospitaller organisation during the Third Crusade, but which soon become a 
military order in which knight brethren were the dominant element. The first 
master of the Templars, a knight from Champagne named Hugh de Payns, 
came to Palestine some time after the First Crusade (probably in 1104) and 
indeed Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights rarely took part in large 
crusade expeditions.32 Rather, they usually entered their respective orders 
in Western Europe, and later travelled to the East by ship, where they were 
assigned postings. In the twelfth century the Templars and Hospitallers main-
tained significant numbers of knight brethren and sergeants who regularly 
fought alongside the forces of the secular rulers, but they made a wider con-
tribution to the defence of Outremer. Since they derived revenues from their 
extensive estates in the West, they were able to finance the maintenance 
and construction of castles, especially in frontier areas. They also purchased 
fiefs and castles from secular nobles, many of whom had become impover-
ished as a result of having to pay ransoms, which meant that the orders ac-
quired vassals of their own, who were obliged to perform military service. 
They also employed Turcopoles, who were under the command of a desig-
31 FOREY, A.J. (1985): “The Emergence of the Military Order in the Twelfth Century”. Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, nº 36, pp. 175-195; BARBER, M. (1994): The New Knighthood: A His-
tory of the Order of the Temple. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-37; CERRINI, 
S. (2001): “Le fondateur de l’ordre du Temple à ses frères: Hugues de Payns et le Sermo Christi 
militibus”. BALARD, M., KEDAR, B.Z, and RILEY-SMITH, J. (eds), Dei gesta per Francos: Etudes sur 
les croisades dédiés à Jean Richard. Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 99-110.
32 A notable exception was the Second Crusade, when a contingent of Templars accompanied the 
army of King Louis VII of France (see Section 3.1 below).
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nated high officer called the turcopolier.33 When King Amalric of Jerusalem 
planned the invasion and annexation of Egypt in 1168-1171, the Hospi-
tallers agreed to provide 500 knights and 500 Turcopoles in exchange for 
major territorial concessions in the Nile Delta and revenues elsewhere in 
Egypt.34 It is unlikely that the order could garrison its castles and undertake 
campaigns of this magnitude using only its own knight brethren, sergeants 
and Turcopoles, and there is considerable evidence that both Hospitallers 
and Templars employed different sorts of soldier who were not members of 
the orders. Some were mercenaries: knights, sergeants and even Turcopoles 
who were hired from outside. These contrasted with the volunteers known 
as milites ad terminum, recruited from lords and knights from the West who 
served for a limited period at their own expense. It is possible that these 
men arrived in the East in the periods between major crusade expeditions, 
and regarded service with one of the orders as the most promising opportu-
nity to gain experience of combat against the Muslims.35
3. the lAter CrusADes
3.1. the Second Crusade (1147-1149)
Thus, from the middle third of the twelfth century until the late thirteenth, the 
crusades were fought by several distinct categories of soldier: crusaders, 
that is volunteers from Western Europe who had taken vows to defend or 
liberate the Holy Land; the lords, knights, sergeants and Turcopoles in the 
33 BARBER, The New Knighthood, pp. 166, 189; NICHOLSON, H. (2001): The Knights Hospi-
taller. Woodbridge, Boydell Press, pp. 21-23; FOREY, A.J. (1984): “The Militarisation of the 
Hospital of St John”. Studia Monastica, nº 26, pp. 75-89; RILEY-SMITH, J. (2012): The Knights 
Hospitaller in the Levant, c. 1070-1309. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 27-51; BURG-
TORF, J. (2006): “The Military Orders in the Crusader Principality of Antioch”. CIGGAAR, K. and 
METCALF, M. (eds), East and West in the Medieval Mediterranean, I: Antioch from the Byzantine 
Reconquest until the End of the Crusader Principality. Leuven, Uitgeverij Peeters, pp. 217-246.
34 MURRAY, A.V. (2016): “The Grand Designs of Gilbert of Assailly: The Order of the Hospital in 
the Projected Conquest of Egypt by King Amalric of Jerusalem (1168–1169)”. Ordines Militares: 
Yearbook for the Study of the Military Orders, nº 20, pp. 7–24; MURRAY, A.V. (2016): “The 
Place of Egypt in the Military Strategy of the Crusades, 1099–1221”. MYLOD, E.J., PERRY, G., 
SMITH, T.W. and VANDEBURIE, J. (eds.), The Fifth Crusade in Context: The Crusading Movement 
in the Early Thirteenth Century. Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 117–134.
35 FOREY, A.J. (2008): “Milites ad terminum in the Service of the Military Orders during the Twelfth 
and Thirteenth Centuries”. UPTON-WARD, J. (ed.), The Military Orders, 4: On Land and by Sea. 
Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 5-11; FOREY, A.J. (2016): “Paid Troops in the Service of the Military Or-
ders during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries”. BOAS, A. (ed.), The Crusader World. London, 
Routledge, pp. 84-97.
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Frankish principalities of Outremer; the warrior monks and their service 
personnel in the military monastic orders; and mercenaries, who might have 
served any one of the other three groups who were wealthy enough to hire 
them. The involvement of each group varied considerably over time, and 
the character of crusades in particular began to change quite fundamentally 
from the later twelfth century onwards. Numerous land and sea expeditions 
continued to arrive in the East in the period between 1099 and 1147. The 
crusades of 1101, 1122-1124 and 1129 brought smaller numbers than in 
1096-1099, and once they had arrived in Outremer they fought alongside 
seasoned local Frankish forces, who by this time had considerable experi-
ence in fighting their Turkish and Egyptian opponents. It was only with the 
so-called Second Crusade (1147-1149) that numbers of crusaders were 
comparable to those in Pope Urban’s expedition. 
While a combined force from northern Germany, the Low Countries and 
England sailed via Iberia, the main armies travelled by land, led Conrad 
III, king of Germany, and Louis VII, king of France. These two expeditions 
were bedevilled by problems similar to those which had been evident in the 
First Crusade, which were already evident in the period of preaching and 
recruitment. In 1146 a French Cistercian named Ralph inspired large num-
bers in the Rhineland, but their energies were largely directed into attacks 
on Jewish communities. He was eventually persuaded to desist and return to 
his monastery by Bernard of Clairvaux, who preached in a more moderate 
manner throughout south-western Germany, but it was noticeable that while 
large numbers of common people took the cross, those who were better off 
and experienced in warfare held back. When King Conrad took the cross 
at Easter 1147 in Würzburg along with numerous bishops, counts and 
nobles, large numbers of brigands and thieves turned up. This was not sur-
prising. Bernard’s preaching emphasised that sinners and criminals could 
redeem themselves by fighting for the cross, while a famine in 1146 meant 
that many peasants and agricultural labourers joined up in the hope of bet-
ter prospects. Conor Kostick has convincingly argued that Conrad’s army 
contained a large popular element which caused major problems during 
the passage through Byzantine territory with indiscriminate violence, looting 
and attacks on local populations, and ultimately forced Conrad to abandon 
his advance on the Anatolian plateau.36 This element was not only indisci-
36 PHILLIPS, J. (2007): The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom. New Haven, 
Yale University Press, pp. 80-103; KOSTICK, C. (2010): “Social Unrest and the Failure of Conrad 
III’s March through Anatolia, 1147”. German History, nº 28, pp. 125-142.
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plined; it had little real fighting experience. One of several sources which 
describe these events, the Annals of Pöhlde, describes the passage through 
Turkish-held territory, reporting that “the pedites were worn out by starva-
tion and ignorant of wars”. The Latin term pedites is normally translated as 
“footsoldiers”, in distinction to mounted knights (milites), but this meaning 
makes little sense in this context; rather, pedites here is more likely to mean 
the large number of common people who were travelling on foot but had no 
military experience.37 Most of these refused to co-operate with the crusade 
leadership and became separated from the main force of knights. On 26 
October 1147 they were overwhelmed by the army of Mas‘ud, sultan of 
Rūm, and Conrad had little choice but to lead the survivors back to Con-
stantinople. 
We know less about the composition of the French army, but descriptions 
given by the chronicler suggest something similar. Unusually, Louis was ac-
companied by a contingent of Templars under their master, Everard of Bar-
res, who acted as guides and divisional commanders during the crossing 
of Anatolia. Despite the support of such disciplined warriors, discipline left 
much to be desired. As Louis led his troops over the Kadmos mountain in 
southern Anatolia, a mass of common people lagged behind and began to 
be picked off by Turkish horse archers. Louis led his vanguard back to go to 
their aid, but the commoners, described as a “mob” (turba), failed to main-
tain resistance and fled, exposing themselves and the king’s own troops to 
destruction. After this disaster Louis complained bitterly about the “unarmed 
mob” (inermem turbam) which had slowed down the passage and made 
food expensive. However, their numbers were swelled by those whom the 
chronicler Odo of Deuil neatly describes as “those whom nature or fortune 
had made into footsoldiers” (Illi … quos natura fecerat pedites vel fortuna), 
explaining that many of the nobles were marching not with the cavalry, 
but among the mob in “an unaccustomed manner” (multi enim nobiles re-
bus preditis vel expensis more insolito ibant in turba).  The combination of 
Turkish attacks and privation meant that many horses died of hunger, were 
killed in fighting, or were slaughtered for food, and many who had lost their 
mounts threw away much of their equipment rather carry it in foot.38 When 
the army reached the coast, those who could afford it were desperate to 
buy fresh horses, as this would have most readily restored their fighting 
37 ‘Annales Palidenses’, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, nº 16 (1869), pp. 82-83: 
pedites inedia fatigati nec bellorum gnari ideoque minus cauti periculorum.
38 Odo of Deuil, De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem, ed. and trans. V.G. BERRY (New York, Co-
lumbia University Press, 1948), pp. 114-135 (here 124, 130). English translations by the present 
author.
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ability, but mounts were practically unobtainable. According to Odo, the 
French barons lamented to their king, saying “since they have cast their 
arms aside, all of the common knights in your army have been reduced 
to foot soldiers … and the same fate has befallen many of the more noble 
ones”.39 This entire dialogue is clearly a literary construction, but it encap-
sulates how the status of knights and nobles could be reduced to the level 
of commoners through the loss of horses and equipment, in much the same 
way as had occurred during the expeditions of 1096-1099. The military 
defeats suffered by both German and French armies in Asia Minor not only 
reduced the numbers that they were able to bring to the Holy Land; they 
also meant that these disparate forces were never able to develop the type 
of cohesion that was achieved by the First Crusade armies as they marched 
south from Antioch. 
3.2. from Land Campaigns to Sea voyages
After 1149 there was a significant change in the composition of crusade ex-
peditions. By and large, crusade expeditions came to comprise a far higher 
proportion of crusaders who could be regarded as professionals, that is 
nobles, knights and footsoldiers and support personnel such as grooms or 
squires. The leadership were keen to exclude the indigent, who would put a 
strain on financial and alimentary resources and had little fighting ability, as 
previous experience had shown. It was never possible to exclude civilians 
entirely. For one thing, clerics were invariably present to act as advisors to 
secular leaders and also to provide for the spiritual welfare of the troops. 
Some women were allowed to participate carry out duties such as laundry 
and delousing.40 However, those expeditions which actually reached the 
East did not contain anything like the large popular elements that were 
found in 1096 and 1147. When preaching did produce a large response 
from the common people, these usually combined into disorganised and 
undisciplined mobs which were shunned by knights and nobles, as was the 
case with the so-called Pastores who received considerable popular support 
in France and western Germany in 1251 and 1320.
There were two main organisational and logistic factors which helped bring 
about this change. The first was the introduction of dedicated crusade tax-
ation. Between 1166 and 1199 the kings of France and England and the 
39 Odo of Deuil, De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem, p. 130: Omnes vestri exercitus gregarii 
milites his diebus armis proiectis pedites sunt effecti, et cum eis de nobilioribus multi. English 
translation by Berry (p. 131).
40 TYERMAN, How to Plan a Crusade, p. 249.
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popes declared various taxes on incomes and property which were to be 
used for the defence or liberation of the Holy Land. Collection methods var-
ied, but in general the proceeds went to kings or other nobles who were in 
the process of organising crusades. This meant that they were able to divert 
funds to their own followers and others whose skills and equipment would 
be of the greatest use on campaign. 
An equally important matter was a shift towards seaborne expeditions. Up 
to the time of the Third Crusade (1189-1192) some smaller expeditions 
had travelled to Palestine by sea, but larger armies (which we could define 
as those numbering thousands) all took overland routes, proceeding either 
down the Italian peninsula with a short crossing of the Adriatic to link with 
the Byzantine road system, or along the Danube and through the Balkans. 
From Constantinople various routes were available through Asia Minor, 
although as the examples from the Second Crusade show, these all carried 
the risk of privation and attacks from the Turkish powers of Anatolia and 
nomadic Türkmen tribesmen.41 A turning point came about at the time of the 
Third Crusade (1189-1192), called in response to the defeat of King Guy 
of Jerusalem by Saladin at Hattin and the subsequent loss of Jerusalem and 
most of the Holy land in 1187. Frederick Barbarossa, Holy Roman emper-
or, assembled an army at Regensburg and marched along the traditional 
route through the Balkans. This had a logistic advantage in that much of 
the army’s baggage could by transported by boat on the Danube as far as 
Byzantine territory. Frederick may also have been influenced by his own 
experience, having accompanied his uncle Conrad III by land in the Second 
Crusade. However, the armies of Richard the Lionheart of England and Phil-
ip Augustus of France covered the greater part of their journeys by sea, and 
all subsequent expeditions to the Levant were carried on fleets. This shift was 
brought about by technological possibilities as well as logistical necessity. 
Developments in shipbuilding and navigation made it possibly to transport 
horses over long distances by sea, something which had been quite im-
practical around 1100.42 The transport of knights and their horses meant 
41  MURRAY, A.V. (2012): “Roads, Bridges and Shipping in the Passage of Crusade Armies by 
Overland Routes to the Bosporus, 1096–1190”. BLASCHITZ, G., HOLZNER-TOBISCH, K., and 
KÜHTREIBER, Th. (eds.), Die Vielschichtigkeit der Straßen: Kontinuität und Wandel in Mittelalter 
und früher Neuzeit. Wien, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 183–
207.
42  PRYOR, J.H. (1982): “Transportation of Horses by Sea during the Era of the Crusades: Eighth 
Century to 1285 A.D.”. Mariner’s Mirror, nº 68, pp. 9–27, 103–125; PRYOR, J.H. (2015): “A 
Medieval Mediterranean Maritime Revolution: Crusading by Sea, ca. 1096 -1204”. CARLSON, 
D.N., LEIDWANGER, J., and KAMPBELL, S.M. (eds.), Maritime Studies in the Wake of the Byzan-
tine Shipwreck at Yassıada, Turkey. College Station, Texas A&M University Press, pp. 174-188.
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that large quantities of equipment could also be carried. Thus Richard the 
Lionheart arranged for many thousands of horseshoes to be supplied to his 
troops; it would have been difficult to carry these by land, but the capacity 
of his ships made it possible.43 All of these factors combined to produce 
the conditions for a more professional army. The final consideration was 
that with ships under the command of royal officers it was now possible to 
physically prevent undesirables from taking part. 
The dimensions of such organisational changes can be seen in the logis-
tic arrangements contracted for the Fourth Crusade (1201-1204). While 
previous expeditions had been directed to the Holy Land, the leaders who 
planned the crusade in the years 1199-1201 decided to make a major 
attack against Egypt, the centre of the power of the Ayyūbid dynasty (Sal-
adin’s successors). The aim was to strike a major blow which would force 
the Ayyūbid sultan to surrender Jerusalem and other territories in a negoti-
ated peace. Representatives of the crusade leadership negotiated a treaty 
with the republic of Venice, whose doge and counsellors agreed to provide 
transport for the entire crusade army and to supplement this with additional 
ships and naval forces. The treaty specified that transport would be pro-
vided for 4500 “well-armed knights” (milites bene armatos) and the same 
number of horses, 9000 squires (scutiferos), and 20,000 “well-armed foot 
soldiers” (pedites bene armatos).44 These Latin descriptions correspond to 
the French terms used in the account of the treaty given by the French chron-
icler Villehardouin: chevaliers, escuiers, and serjanz a pié.45 These categories 
suggest a completely professional army. Since each knight was allowed 
two scutiferi or escuiers, it is tempting to assume that one was in charge 
of the knight’s horse while the other was to look after his equipment and 
help him arm. The term pedites bene armatos or serjanz a pié undoubtedly 
meant that these were expected to be experienced soldiers with good quality 
equipment, corresponding to the foot sergeants employed in the armies of 
Outremer and the military orders, rather than simply untrained pilgrims on 
foot. They included specialists such as crossbowmen, who fought well at 
43  TYERMAN, How to Plan a Crusade, pp. 263-265.
44 Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig: mit besonderer Bez-
iehung auf Byzanz und die Levante vom neunten bis zum Ausgang des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts, 
ed. G.L.F. TAFEL and G. THOMAS, 3 vols (Wien, Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856-1857), vol. 1, 
pp. 365-366.
45 Villehardouin, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. and trans. E. FARAL, 2 vols (Paris, Les Belles 
Lettres, 1961), vol. 1, pp. 22-25.
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Constantinople, but overall the crusaders who assembled at Venice were far 
short of the numbers agreed in the treaty, and many were not of the quality 
envisaged in it. Robert of Clari, a French crusader, describes a category he 
calls the “common people” (menue gent) who nevertheless had to fight. In 
the first assault on Constantinople (July 1203), the commanders ordered up 
all the grooms and cooks in the army and kitted them out with improvised 
arms and armour; despite the inferior quality of this equipment, they were 
encouraged that these temporary soldiers were so “ugly and hideous that 
the common foot soldiers of the emperor, who were in front of the walls, 
had great fear and terror when they saw them”.46 Clari also tells of clerics 
who took part in the fighting. A priest, Aleaumes de Clari, had either come 
with, or acquired a horse and hauberk; since he had fought like a knight, 
he argued that he was entitled to a knight’s share in the booty after the final 
assault in April 1204.47
The failure of the crusade occurred because insufficient numbers arrived at 
Venice by the agreed departure date. Since the reduced army could not 
raise the agreed costs of transport, it had no choice but to follow Venetian 
direction, a decision which ultimately led to the diversion of the crusade to 
Constantinople. However, the process of planning and recruitment show 
that a century after Pope Urban’s appeal, the business of crusading was 
expected to succeed only with personnel who could be described as pro-
fessionals. 
ConClusions
The idealistic intentions of the papacy to liberate (and later to defend) the 
Holy Land would require the whole-hearted participation of the traditional 
military classes of Western Europe. This was why at the Council of Clermont 
Pope Urban II appealed to the class of knights. Yet the definition of the 
crusade as a pilgrimage, with unheard of spiritual rewards, meant that all 
sections of the population were encouraged to take part, most of whom had 
46 Robert de Clari, La Conquête de Constantinople, ed. P. LAUER (Paris, Honoré Champion, 1974), 
p. 46: Et aprés prist on tous les garchons qui les chevax gardoient, et tous les cuisiniers qui armes 
peurent porter; si les fist on trestous armer et de keutes pointes et de peniax et de pos de coivre et 
de poletes et de pestiaux, si k’il estoient si lait et si hideus qie le menue gent a pié l’empereur, qui 
estoient par dehors les murs, en eurent grant peur et grant hisde, quant ils les virent. Translation 
from: Robert of Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1936), p. 72.
47 Robert de Clari, La Conquête de Constantinople, p. 96.
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little military skill or experience, and often insufficient funds or equipment 
to function effectively through the rigours of the journey. The dichotomy 
between military professionals and elites on the one hand, and popular ele-
ments on the other constituted the main factor which threatened the success 
of crusading during this period, even more than political rivalries based on 
national or feudo-vassalic allegiances. This situation only began to change 
from 1189 onwards. The shift away from land-based to seaborne expe-
ditions, although undertaken primarily for logistical reasons, allowed the 
organisers to exclude popular elements in favour of trained professional 
soldiers. However, the concentration on professionalism brought about a 
necessity for upfront funding on a hitherto unimagined scale, which pro-
duced unforecast problems in the crusade originally intended to be directed 
against Egypt in 1201.
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